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I INTRODUCTION
Economists have long speculated on why such astounding differences in the productivity
performance exist between firms and plants within countries, even within tightly defined sectors.
For example, labour productivity varies dramatically even with the same four or five digit
industries, with these differences often highly persistent over time (Baily et al. (1992),
Bartelsman and Dhrymes (1998) and Disney, Haskel and Heden (2003)).
The focus of economists has been in “chipping away” at these productivity differences through
better measures of inputs (capital, materials, skills, etc.). Some parts of the literature have
attempted to see how much of the residual can be accounted for by explicit measures of
technology such as Research and Development (R&D), patents or computerisation (Griliches,
1980, Stiroh, 2002). But technology is only one part of the story and a substantial unexplained
productivity differential still remains, which panel data econometricians often label as the fixed
effects of “managerial quality” (see, for example, Mundlak (1961) and Bailey et al. (1992)).
While the popular press and Business Schools place huge stress on the importance of good
management, economists have until recently had relatively little to say about management
practices per se. A major problem has been the absence of good quality data on managerial
practices that is measured in a consistent way across countries and firms. One of the purposes of
this paper is to present a survey instrument for the measurement of managerial practices. We
collect original data using this survey instrument on a sample of about 730  medium sized
manufacturing firms in the US, UK, France and Germany. After matching this data with
information on firm accounts we are able to directly address the association between managerial
practices and firm performance.
Our work relates to the recent contribution of Bertrand and Schoar (2003) which emphasises the
importance of managers in firm performance. They focus on the impact of changing Chief
Executive Officers (CEOs)  and Chief Financial Officers (CFOs) in large quoted U.S. firms,
which will tend to reflect the impact of management styles and strategies. Our work, with its
emphasis measuring the practices of middle management, complements Bertrand and Schoar
(2003) by looking at firm practices as revealed by the typical middle manager
1. We see practices
as more than the attributes of the top managers: they are part of the organisational structure and
behaviour of the firm, typically evolving slowly over time as CEOs and CFOs come and go.
We start by analysing the raw survey data and observe a surprisingly large spread in management
practices across firms. Using multiple surveys of the same firm by different interviewers we
calibrate our measurement error and show that this can only account for about a quarter of the
distribution in management practices, with the remaining three quarters due to a wide underlying
distribution of practices. Most notably, using our measure, we see that a large number of firms
are extremely badly managed with ineffective monitoring, targets and incentives. 
 
1 In a sub-sample of 15 companies we piloted questions on the hierarchical structure of the firm and found the
average number (standard deviation) of levels to the shop floor was 6.3 (2.1) for the CEO versus 3.4 (2.1) for the
plant managers (our target management group) placing them centrally within the organisation.3
We then present compelling evidence that better managerial practices are significantly associated
with higher productivity and other indicators of firm performance, even after accounting for a
host of measurement and econometric issues. This is true both in the Anglo-Saxon countries
investigated (the UK and the US) and the Continental European countries investigated (France
and Germany); suggesting our characterization of good management practice is not intrinsically
Anglo-Saxon biased. Across the sample management practices account for a significant
proportion of the variance in TFP between firms and between countries (about 10-20%), and we
note this may actually be substantially greater than estimated due to the downward bias in our
coefficients from measurement error.
This raises the question of why there is such a variation in management practices across firms?
We present three possible explanations:
1. Product market competition, at the national sector level, plays a key role in determining
the level of management practice, with higher competition likely to increase the exit rate
of badly managed firms so improving average management practices. We find little
evidence for any additional “effort” effect of competition in getting managers to work
‘harder’
2. Older firms, controlling for selection effects, have poorer management practices. This is
consistent with the idea that new entrants find it easier to adopt the better management
practices of the era they were founded than their older counterparts
2.
3. Stronger labour-market regulation significantly impedes good management practice,
particularly in firms with longer tenured employees. This suggests that regulation
impedes the adoption of new management practices
These results build on the productivity analysis of the McKinsey Global Institute (MGI), who
over many years have studied and analysed productivity across a range of countries and sectors.
The MGI find a lack of competition and excessive regulation are some of the main drivers of
productivity differences across countries and across a wide range of sectors from manufacturing,
to retail and construction
3. Our study suggests that one of the key routes for competition and
regulation to drive productivity is via management practices themselves.
The layout of the paper is as follows. Section II discussed why management practices could vary,
section III discusses measuring management practices the management data, section IV the
model and the results, section V the distribution of management practice and section VI
considers the evidence possible causes for the variations in management. Some concluding
comments are in section VII. More details of the data, models and results can be found in the
Appendices.
2 A similar result was reported by Ichniowski et al. (1997) in their work on 19 US steel finishing plants, where they
find the youth of the plant is a significant predictor of HRM best practices.
3See, for example, MGI (1998), MGI (2003a) and MGI (2003b)4
II WHY SHOULD MANAGEMENT PRACTICES VARY?
A challenge for economics is to explain why poorly managed firms can co-exist with well-run
firms in the same product market. In a competitive marketplace one would expect to see the
inefficiently run firms driven out of the market
4.
There are at least three groups of theories that could explain the paradox. First and foremost,
firms may operate in environments with different degrees of product market competition – this
enables poorer managed firms to survive in equilibrium. Second, even if the market is
competitive there are important dynamics that may allow inefficient firms to survive, at least for
some period of time. Thirdly and most simply, there are differential costs of good management
driven for example, by government imposed regulatory constraints over the “right to manage”.
We consider each of these theories and examine their empirical predictions.
II.A The degree of product market competition
Moving away from perfect competition means that inefficient firms can survive in the
marketplace even in the long-run. But the exact theoretical relationship between competition and
management is complex. Crudely, one could consider two views of management practices
(formally we will model this by better management being associated with a lower firm-specific
marginal cost, but this could just as well be considered as higher quality, etc.):
1. Entrepreneurs found firms with distinctive cultures that are deeply embedded and hard to
change over time. Entrepreneurs do not know exactly how well the particular type of firm
will perform until they enter a market and compete with other firms. We call this
“selection of the well managed”.
2. Firms can influence management practices through a variety of mechanisms. This could
be, for example, committing to a particular remuneration contract in a principal-agent
setting in order to elicit greater managerial effort, or investing a greater amount in
improving management in an analogous way to a non-tournament model of cost reducing
R&D. Such investment could, for example, take the form of hiring the best managers. We
call these effects “contracting for managerial effort”.
The key question we will investigate is: what is the impact of increasing product market
competition on management best practice?
Selection of the well managed
There is much evidence that management practices are hard to change and are deeply embedded
in the culture of an organisation. When entrepreneurs found firms they are often poorly informed
as to “what works best” in a particular market context. Tough product market competition will
vigorously eliminate firms with poor management practices and surviving firms will, on average,
4 For empirical evidence on competition and productivity see inter alia Nickell (1996) or Syverson (2004b)5
be those with higher managerial quality. Less competitive product markets will be characterised
by on average worse management. So it is likely that higher competition will be associated with
better average management practices. Additionally, the dispersion of management practices will
be lower when the degree of product market competition is higher as the ‘tail’ of poorly managed
firms will be truncated. Syverson (2004a) offers supportive evidence of these predictions in his
analysis of the US cement industry, focusing on total factor productivity. He finds that tougher
competition is associated with higher average productivity with a lower variation.
Contracting for managerial effort
The alternative approach sees the determination of management practices as the endogenous
choice of firms in response to their competitive environment. Consider a simple Bertrand
differentiated product model to show some of the forces at play. We allow firms to choose
contracts with managers after they have entered the market, but before their marginal costs are
revealed. Marginal costs are an outcome of managers’ (unobservable) efforts and a cost shock.
We assume that the distribution of cost shocks is not so large that any firms exit the market (this
is in order to reduce selection effects and focus on the effort effect). “Investing in managerial
effort” is essentially choosing a higher powered incentive contract that will elicit more effort
(better managerial practices) but at the cost of giving away more of the firm’s profits to the
manager.
For a given number of firms an increase in competition (again indexed by an increase in product
substitutability) has an ambiguous effect on managerial effort. On the one hand higher
competition should increase a firm’s incentives to promote managerial effort because any unit
cost reduction will have a larger effect on market share. On the other hand, super-normal profits
are lower when competition is higher, so any increase in market share will generate less profit.
This will tend to reduce the incentives to supply more managerial effort. Now allow the numbers
of firms to change as product market competition increases. When we allow entry to be
endogenous there is fall in the number of firms who choose to enter the market because profits
are lower when competition is tougher. In a free-entry long-run equilibrium there will be fewer
firms and the average firm will be larger in size. This means they have a greater desire to cut
marginal costs through higher managerial effort as they are spreading these benefits over a larger
scale. In the context of this simple model (which follows Raith, 2003), once we allow for
endogenous market structure an increase in product market competition unambiguously increases
good management practices
5.
Although we have discussed this in a principal-agent context the same intuition follows if we
consider a model of non-tournament process R&D. This can be regarded as an investment in
cost-reducing management practices prior to competing on prices. Increases in competition will
have the same impact on the incentive to make such investments as it would have on the
incentives to increase managerial effort in the principal-agent set-up (see Vives, 2004). Both are
5 Schmidt (1997) allows bankruptcy costs in a principal agent model with Cournot competition. With risk neutrality,
but a wealth constrained manager, the fear of bankruptcy will increase the incentive of the manager to supply effort.
Nevertheless, the rent reducing effect of competition will still exist and could be large enough to completely offset
the fear of bankruptcy effect. Compared to Schmidt (1997) it is allowing for the endogeneity of entry which makes a
substantial difference to the comparative statics as mean firm size will be larger following an increase in
competition.6
cost-reducing investments so will increase with product market competition (at least under the
assumptions of the differentiated product model).
The result that increased product market competition (indexed by higher product substitutability)
should improve incentives for managerial practices (though cost reducing investments) are
reasonably robust, but not completely general. Vives (2004) shows that providing the market for
varieties does not shrink, the result goes through under more general forms of demand in a
variety of Bertrand differentiated product models. He also shows that product market competition
will increase effort under Cournot competition so long as output reaction functions are downward
sloping, which is the standard case.
Summary
For both reasons of selection and investment, increases in product market competition would
tend to be associated with better managerial practices. However, it is of empirical interest not
only whether this prediction holds, but if it does, what is the mechanism through which
competition matters? If the impact is primarily though selection we would expect that in more
competitive industries to see superior management practices in older ‘surviving’ firms,
emphasizing the central role of entry and exit. If the impact is primarily through greater
managerial effort we should expect to see this indicated in other outcomes (such as managerial
hours) and perhaps through other measures of corporate governance
6.
II.B Dynamics and the age of the firm
Even in models of perfectly competitive product markets, dynamic effects may mean that poorly
managed firms can survive for a period of time. For example, in the Jovanovic (1982) model
firms take time to learn about their own quality so even poorly managed firms will continue
producing for some periods before they exit. Empirically, researchers who have followed
cohorts of plants show that the least productive tend to exit earlier on average. Consequently, as
the cohort ages there is an increase in average productivity within the cohort (these dynamic
selection effects are mainly played out in first five years according to Jensen et al (2001), see
also Disney et al. (2003)). This pattern is made more complex, however, by the fact that new
firms will tend to begin operating with newer and presumably better practice management
techniques relative to incumbents. As discussed above, this may be because older firms find it
difficult to change their organisations in response to new conditions
7. This will give rise to cohort
(or ‘vintage’) effects where more recent cohorts of firms start off with a systematically higher
mean level of good management practices than earlier cohorts.
The impact of these dynamic considerations is that in industries with lower product market
competition, and therefore few selection pressures, we will observe in the cross section that older
firms have systematically worse management practices than the younger firms. This is because
6 Better managerial outcomes would be expected from firms more subject to tighter corporate governance (see
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
7 See Ichinowski et al (1995, 1997) for example. In their work on 19 US steel finishing plants, where they find the
youth of the plant is a significant predictor of HRM best practices, with older firms being impeded from adopting the
latest HRM practices by internal organizational rigidity.7
older firms, founded in earlier time periods, may be using less sophisticated management practice
techniques on average. In a more competitive industry the cross sectional pattern between
management quality and competition will be more hump-shaped. For the younger firms selection
effects are very strong (in the first 5 or 10 years) and the younger firms will initially have lower
management scores on average than their slightly older rivals. However, eventually the cohort
effects are likely to dominate the selection effects and there will emerge a clear negative
relationship between company age and management best practices even in these more
competitive industries.
To evaluate these we set up a very simple simulation model combining selection effects and
cohort effects
8. This models a large fixed population of firms with a 2% annual rate of entry and
exit. The entrants are drawn from a normal distribution with an upwardly trending mean. The exit
occurs based on a noisy signal of management ability. Thus, every period worse managed firms
are more likely to exit generating a selection effect over time, while the new entrants are drawn
from an upwardly trending distribution generating a cohort effect. For this cohort effect to exist it
is only important that the new entrants improve their management practices at a relatively faster
rate than the incumbents. So while incumbents may learn and embody some of the latest
managerial practices, they do this at a slower rate than the new entrants.
[FIGURES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
Figure 1 plots average management practice scores against log firm-age, depicting a clear hump
shaped relationship. For the first fifteen years management practices improve on average as the
selection effects dominate. After this initial period, however, most of the badly managed firms
have been eliminated and the cohort effect dominates, driven by worse management practice
scores in the remaining upper-tail of firms. Figure 2 plots the same management practice against
log firm-age but with the selection effects of competition turned off by removing any
management signal from the exit process. This generates a clear downward sloping relationship
as the cohort effects dominates in the absence of any selection mechanism removing poorly
managed firms.
II.C Regulatory costs on managers
If firms can influence managerial practices they will weigh up the benefits and the costs of
making such changes (Corrada, Hulten and Sichel, 2004, consider extending the standard
production function to allow for variety of investments in “organisational capital”). We have
discussed how the benefits of making changes will depend on the degree of product market
competition and the form of the production function (which itself may differ across industries).
The costs of good managerial practices may vary for a number of reasons (including firm age),
but one important exogenous source of variation is government regulation. High firing costs, for
example, will make it difficult to remove underperforming middle managers who may form
coalitions to block change. Since regulations differ substantially across the countries in our
sample (e.g. Botero et al (2004)), this is an important potential driver of management practices.
Furthermore we would expect the costs of job regulation to be most binding on firms with longer
8 The full Matlab code is available from n.bloom@lse.ac.uk8
tenured managers who have acquired more job rights, so there will be within country variation in
the effects of these regulations.
III MEASURING MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
To investigate these issues we first have to construct a robust measure of management practices
overcoming three hurdles: scoring management practices; collecting accurate responses; and
obtaining interviews with managers. We discuss these in turn:
III.A Scoring Management Practices
To measure management requires codifying the concept of good and bad management into a
measure applicable to different firms within the manufacturing sector. McKinsey & Company
have developed an interview based management practice evaluation tool which defines and
scores from 1 (worst practice) to 5 (best practice) across 18 of the key management practices
which appear to matter to industrials firms based upon their expertise in working with thousands
of companies across several decades.
The questions in the survey order, the scoring system and three anonymous responses per
question are provided in Appendix A1. These questions can be grouped into four areas: shop-
floor management (3 questions), monitoring (5 questions), targets (5 questions) and, incentives
(5 questions). The shop-floor management section focuses on some typical lean manufacturing
techniques such as the development of a lean internal supply chain, the documentation of
processes improvements and the rationale behind introductions of improvements. The monitoring
section focuses on the tracking of performance of individuals, reviewing performance (e.g.
through regular appraisals and job plans), and “consequence” management (e.g. making sure that
plans are kept and appropriate sanctions and rewards are in place). The targets section examines
the type of targets (whether goals are simply financial or, better, more holistic), the realism of the
targets (stretching, unrealistic or non-binding), and the range and interconnection of targets (e.g.
whether they are given consistently throughout the organisation). Finally “incentives” includes
promotion criteria, pay/bonuses and fixing/firing bad performers, where best practice is deemed
to be an approach that gives strong rewards for those with both ability and effort. A subset of the
incentives, targets and operations questions have similarities with those used in studies on HRM
practices, such as Ichinowski, Shaw and Prenushi (1997) and Black and Lynch (2002).
Since the scaling may vary across questions in the econometric estimations we convert the scores
(from the 1 to 5 scale) to z-scores by normalizing by question to mean zero and standard
deviation one. In our main econometric specifications we take the unweighted average across all
z-scores as our primary measure of managerial practices, but we also experiment with other
weightings schemes based on factor analysis approaches.
There is scope for legitimate disagreement over whether all of these measures really constitute
“good practice”. So an important way to examine the externality validity of the measures is to
examine whether they are correlated with data on firm performance constructed from company
accounts and the stock market. We also examine whether the relationship between management9
practices and productivity is weaker in the Continental European nations to check for “Anglo-
Saxon” bias.
III.B Collecting Accurate Responses
With this management practice evaluation tool we can, in principle, provide some quantification
of firms’ management practices. However, an important issue is the extent to which we can
obtain unbiased responses to these questions from firms. In particular, will respondents provide
accurate responses? As is well known in the surveying literature (see, for example, Bertrand and
Mullainathan, 2001) respondents answers are typically biased by their scoring grid with
responses anchored towards those they expect the interviewer thinks is “correct”. In addition
interviewers may themselves have pre-conceptions about the performance of the firms they are
interviewing and bias their scores based on their ex-ante perceptions. More generally, a range of
background characteristics, potentially correlated with good and bad managers, may generate
some kinds of systematic bias in the survey data.
To try and address these issues we took a range of steps to obtain highly accurate data.
First, the interviewer process was data was ‘double-blind’. Participating managers did not have
transparency that they were being scored during the interviews. The interview was introduced as
a piece of research work which would take around one hour to discuss manufacturing and other
management practices within their firm. Furthermore, interviewers did not know the firm’s
financials or performance in advance. This was achieved by selecting medium sized
manufacturing firms and by providing only firm names and contact details to the interviewers
(but no financial details). The interviewers were specially trained graduate students from top
European and US business schools, with a median age of 29 and 5 years prior business
experience in the manufacturing sector
9.
Second, the survey was executed by telephone using a ‘funnelling’ interviewing technique,
supported by as many responses as necessary to open questions (i.e. “can you tell me how you
promote your employees”), rather than closed questions (i.e. “do you promote your employees on
tenure [yes/no]?”), to get an accurate assessment of the firm’s typical practices. This enabled
scoring to be based on the interviewer’s evaluation of the actual firm practices, rather than the
firm’s aspirations, the manager’s perceptions or the interviewer’s impressions. If an interviewer
could not score a question it was left blank, with the firm average taken over the remaining
questions
10.
Third, the survey instrument was targeted at plant managers, who are typically senior enough to
have an overview of management practices but not so senior as to be detached from day-to-day
operations.
Fourth, we also collected a detailed set of information on the interview process itself (number
and type of prior contacts before obtaining the interviews, duration, local time-of-day, date and
9 Thanks to the interview team of Johannes Banner, Michael Bevan, Mehdi Boussebaa, Dinesh Cheryan, Alberic de
Solere, Manish Mahajan, Simone Martin, Himanshu Pande, Jayesh Patel and Marcus Thielking.
10 The average number of un-scored questions per firm was 0.13%, with no firm included in the sample if more than
three questions were un-scored.10
day-of-the week), on the manager (seniority, nationality, company and job tenure, internal and
external employment experience, and location), and from the interviewer (individual, UK time-
of-day and subjective reliability score). Some of these survey controls are significantly
informative about the management score (see Appendix C and Table C1)
11, and when we use
these as controls for interview noise in our econometric evaluations the coefficient on the
management score typically increased.
III.C Obtaining Interviews with Managers
The interview process takes around one hour per interview and is targeted at relatively senior
managers within the firm. Overall we obtained a high response rate of 54% coverage rate. This
was achieved through a number of steps.
1. The interview was introduced as “Research” without any discussion of the firm’s
financial position or its company accounts, making it relatively uncontroversial for
managers to participate. Interviewers did not discuss financials in the interviews both to
maximise the participation of firms and also to ensure our interviewers were truly “blind”
on the firm’s financial position.
2. Questions were ordered to lead with the least controversial (shop-floor management) and
finish with the most controversial (pay, promotions and firings).
3. Interviewers performance was monitored, as was the proportion of interviews achieved so
they were persistent in chasing firms (the median number of contacts each interviewer
had per interview was 6.4) Since the questions are about practices within the firm any
plant managers can respond, so there are potentially several managers per firm who could
be contacted
12.
4. The combination of the collaboration between the London School of Economics and
McKinsey and Company and the endorsement of the Bundesbank (in Germany) and HM
Treasury (in the UK) helped demonstrate to managers this was a non-commercial
exercise that would provide them with potentially valuable research insight.
III.D Sampling Frame and Additional Data
Since our aim is to compare across countries we decided to focus on the manufacturing sector
where productivity is easier to measure than in the non-manufacturing sector. We also focused on
medium sized firms selecting a sample where employment ranged between 50 and 10,000
workers (with a median of 700). Very small firms have little publicly available data. Very large
11 In particular we found the scores were significantly higher: for senior managers, later in the week and earlier in the
day. That is to say scores were highest, on average, for senior managers on a Friday morning and lowest for junior
managers on a Monday afternoon. By including information on these characteristics in our analysis we explicitly
controlled for these types of interview bias.
12 We found no significant correlation between the number, type and time-span of contacts before an interview is
conducted and the management score. This suggests while different managers may respond differently to the
interview proposition this does not appear to be directly correlated with their responses or the average management
practices of the firm.11
firms are likely to be more heterogeneous across plants and so it would be more difficult to get a
picture of managerial performance in the firm from one or two interviews. We drew a sampling
frame from each country to be representative of medium sized manufacturing firms and then
randomly chose the order of which firms to contact (see Appendix B for details). We also
excluded any McKinsey clients from our sampling frame
13 – both to avoid any perceived
conflicts of interest and ensure there was no bias in the data collection.
In addition to the standard information on management practices, we also collected information -
mainly from a separate questionnaire to the Human Resource department - on the average
characteristics of workers and managers in the firm such as gender, age, proportion with college
degree, average hours, holidays, sickness, occupational breakdown and a range of questions on
the organisational structure of the firm and the work-life balance. The details of this
questionnaire are provided in Appendix A2.
Quantitative information on firm sales, employment, capital, materials etc. came from the
company accounts and proxy statements, while industry level data came from the OECD. The
details are provided in Appendix B.
Comparing the responding firms with those in the sampling frame we found no evidence that the
responders were systematically different on any of the performance measures to the non-
responders. They were also statistically similar on all the other observables in our dataset. The
only exception was on size where our firms were slightly larger than average than those in the
sampling frame.
III.E Evaluating and Controlling for Measurement Error
The data potentially suffers from several types of measurement error that are likely to
downwardly bias our coefficients on management. First, we could have measurement error in the
management practice scores obtained using our survey tool. To quantify this we performed
repeat interviews on 64 firms, contacting different managers in the firm, typically at different
plants, using different interviewers. To the extent that our management measure is truly picking
up general firm level management practices these two scores should be correlated, while to the
extent the measure is driven by noise the measures should be independent.
Figure 3 plots the 64 average firm level scores from the first interview against the second
interviews, from which we can see they are highly correlated (0.734). Furthermore, there is no
obvious (or statistically significant) relationship between the degree of measurement error and
the absolute score. That is to say high and low scores appear to be as well measured as average
scores, and firms that have high (or low) scores on the first interview tend to have high (or low)
scores on the second interview. Thus, firms that score below 2 or above 4 appear to be genuinely
badly or well managed rather than extreme draws of sampling measurement error.
[FIGURE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Analysing the measurement error in more detail (see Appendix C) we find that the question level
measures are noisier, with 42% of the variation in the scores are due to measurement error,
13 This removed 33 firms out of our sampling frame of 1353 firms12
compared to the average firm’s scores with 25% of the variation due to measurement error. This
improved signal-noise ratio in the firm level measure – which is our primary management proxy
- is due to the partial averaging out of measurement errors across questions.
The second type of measurement error concerns the fact that our management practices cover
only a subset of all management practices which drive performance. For example, our interviews
did not contain any questions on management strategy. However, so long as firms’ capabilities
across all management practices are positively correlated - which they are significantly within the
18 practices examined - then our measure based on a subset of practices will provide a proxy of
the firm’s true management capabilities. Again, however, this suggests that the coefficients we
estimate on management are probably biased towards zero due to attenuation bias.
IV MANAGEMENT PRACTICES AND FIRM PERFORMANCE
Before we investigate the reasons for the spread of management practices across firms it is worth
evaluating whether these practices can account for any variation in performance. While it is not
possible to identify any causal relationship between our management practice measures and firm
performance, a significant relationship would indicate our management scores are measuring
something that is important to the operation of firms.
IV.A Econometric Modelling
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where Y = sales, L = labour, K = capital and M= materials of firm i at time t in country c (note
that we allow all firms to have country specific parameters on the inputs), and lower case letters
denote natural logarithms y = ln(Y), etc. The x’s are a number of other controls that will affect
productivity such as workforce characteristics (e.g. human capital, age), firm characteristics (e.g.
firm age) and industry characteristics (generally proxied by a complete set of 3-digit SIC industry
controls).
The crucial variable for us is management practices denoted MNG. Our basic measure takes z-
scores of each of the 18 individual management dimensions examined and then averages over the
variables to get MNG. We experimented with a number of other approaches including using the
primary factor from factor-analysis and using the raw average management scores and found
very similar results. We also looked for complementarities between the different types of
management practices and found some weak support for this.
The most straightforward approach to estimating equation (1) is to run a within-groups
estimation including a large set of possible controls in a first step, and then project the fixed
effects on the management scores in a separate second step. This is analogous to the approach of
Black and Lynch (2001) that followed a similar two step approach in their analysis of workplace
practices and productivity. We use data from 1998-2004 to average out the variables that we do
observe over time, allowing the firm level standard errors to be clustered. Alternatively, we can13
exploit the fact that we have panel data on our firms to estimate over a longer period (1994-
2004), and attempt to deal with the endogeneity of the time varying inputs (capital, labour and
materials). To do this we experiment with two alternative estimation approaches - System GMM
and the Olley Pakes estimator
14. Again, using these estimates of the production function
parameters we construct firm specific efficiency/TFP measures which we then relate in a second
stage to management practices and other time invariant firm characteristics.
Before turning to our results we highlight one important issue regarding the relationship between
management practices and firm performance. Due to the cross-sectional nature of our data we
can not identify the causal relationship between management practices and firm performance,
and there are a number of reasons to be concerned about the potential for feedback. Negative
feedback could occur – biasing our coefficient towards zero – if more productive firms use their
rents to avoid implementing managerial “best practices” which are generally higher effort.
Positive feedback could occur if well managed firms attract higher ability workers, and this is not
controlled for by our human capital measures. So to reiterate our objective in these estimations is
purely to confirm that our management practices measures are significantly correlated with firm
performance measures, indicating they do indeed measure something that is meaningfully related
to firm operations.
IV.B Econometric Results
Table 1 investigates the association between management practices and firm productivity using a
range of alternative econometric methods. Column (1) estimates a within-groups estimator (top
section of the column (1), and then uses the estimated fixed-effects in a second-step cross-
sectional regression on our management practice scores (base of column (1)) and finds a
significant and positive correlation of TFP with management. The Olley Pakes specification is
estimated in the top section of column (2), for which TFP (averaged over the sample for a given
firm) is positively and significantly correlated with our management measure (base of column
(2)). In column (3) we run a System GMM specification, and again taking the predicted fixed
effects find this is also significantly related to management
15.
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
We were concerned that the definition of “good management” may be biased towards an Anglo-
Saxon view of the management world. Some may regard such business practices as suitable for 
the ‘free markets’ of Britain and America, but less suitable to those of Continental Europe. We
empirically tested this in column (4) by re-running the two stage estimation using French and
German companies only and again found a large a highly significant coefficient on management.
Finally, in column (5) we investigated the impact of “consistency” by including the standard-
deviation of the management practices examined within each firm. Controlling for the average
14 See Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998) on System GMM estimation, and Olley and Pakes
(1996) on their estimation strategy.
15 Across these specifications the precise coefficients on capital, labor and materials of course change due to the
different identification assumptions. These three estimators are presented here to show the robustness of the
relationship between management and productivity to any particular estimation approach.14
score we find firms where management practices are consistent across the different areas are
significantly more productive than firms where management practices are inconsistent
16. This
possibly suggests some kind of complementarity between practices. This is maybe not surprising
given the underlying complementarity of the targets, incentives and monitoring practices we
focus on.
Table D1 in Appendix D provides further robustness checks on the management score using
alternative measures of firm performance. In column (1) we directly estimate management
practices in a production function, finding a positive and significant coefficient. In column (2) we
add in a range of controls including: factor coefficients interacted with country dummies to allow
for the coefficients on the conventional inputs to vary across countries due to differences in their
accounting measurement; country and industry dummies to controls for country and industry
fixed effects; a number of extended controls for hours, education, firm age, size and listing
status; and a set of interview controls to control for any biases across interviewers and types of
interviewees
17. Including these controls moderately reduces the size and increases the standard
error on the management coefficient, although the impact is not great and management is still
highly significant. In column (3) we use an alternative performance measure which is return on
capital employed (ROCE), a profitability measure used by financial analysts and managers to
benchmark firm performance
18. The significant and positive coefficient in the ROCE equation,
which also includes the same set of controls as in column (2) confirms the basic productivity
results. In column (4) we estimate a Tobin’s Q specification, which again includes the full
production function controls, and find a significant positive coefficient. Finally in column (5) we
estimate the relationship between growth rates of sales and management practices, again with a
full set of controls, and find a positive significant coefficient. This suggests firms with better
(current) management practices will have higher (current) growth rates.
V THE DISTRIBUTION OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICES
Figure 4 shows the distribution of the average management scores per firm across all 18
questions, plotted by country in raw form (not in z-score form). It is clear that there is a huge
amount of heterogeneity within each country with firms spread across most of the distribution.
About 3% of the overall variation in firms’ average management scores is across countries, 21%
is across 3-digit SIC industries and the remaining 76% is within country and industry. This
spread is particularly wide when considered against the fact that a score of 1 indicates industry
worst practice and 5 industry best practices. So, for example, firms scoring 2 or less have only
basic shop-floor management, very limited monitoring of processes or people, ineffective and
16 For example, for a firm with an average management score of 3 its productivity will be higher on average if it
scored 3 across all 18 questions than if it scored 5 in ½ of the questions and 1 in the other ½ the questions.
17 In Table C1 in the Appendix we detail these noise controls with column (1) reporting the results from regressing
management on the full set of noise controls and column (2) the results from regressing management on our selected
set of (informative) noise controls which we use in our main regressions.
18 Since ROCE is calculated as profit/(shareholder equity + long term debt) it also provides an another measure of
firm performance using different accounting line items from the productivity regression.15
inappropriate targets, and poor incentives and firing mechanisms. Thus, one of the central
questions we focus on in section V is why do these firms exist?
[FIGURE 4 ABOUT HERE]
Looking across countries the US has on average the highest scores (3.37), Germany is second
(3.32), France third (3.13) and the UK last (3.08), with the gap between the US and UK
statistically significant at the 5% level. We were concerned that some of this may simply be
driven by differences in the sampling size distribution, but these figures are robust to controls for
size and public ownership.
The presence of the US at the top of the ranking is consistent with anecdotal evidence from other
surveys
19. One might suspect this was due to an “Anglo-Saxon” bias. This is why we had to
confront the scores with data on productivity to show that they are correlated with real outcomes
within countries. Furthermore, the position of the UK as the country with the lowest average
management scores indicates that the survey instrument is not intrinsically Anglo-Saxon biased.
Table A1 in Appendix A provides more details behind these cross-country comparisons, and
reveal a relative US strength in human-capital management (monitoring and incentives) versus a
German and French strength in more physical-capital and operational management (shop-floor
and monitoring)
20.
We also undertook factor analysis on the individual questions. Interestingly there appeared to be
one dominant factor that loaded heavily on all our questions – which could be labelled “good
management” – which accounted for 49% of the variation. The only other notable factor, which
accounted for a further 7% of the variation, could be labelled as “incentives minus operations”,
which had a positive loading on incentives and a negative loading on shop-floor and performance
monitoring.
VI THE CAUSES OF MANAGEMENT PRACTICE VARIATIONS
The evidence presented in section IV demonstrated that good management practices are
significantly related to firm performance, while the evidence in section V demonstrated a wide
distribution in management practices. But this raises the question of why so many firms appear to
be deploying sub-optimal practices? In this section we explore the role of three factors which
may help to explain the tail of poorly managed firms.
VI.A Management Practices, Product Market Competition and Firm Age
19 For example, Proudfoot (2003) regularly reports that US firms were least hindered by poor management practices
(36%) compared to Australia, France, Germany, Spain, South Africa and the UK. Unfortunately, these are only from
the consulting groups’ clients so are unlikely to be representative.
20 In the survey we also collected two questions on organizational structure (see Appendix A2) taken from
Bresnahan et al. (2002). We found in France and German firms were significantly more hierarchical (gave managers
more power relative to workers) in pace and task allocation compared to the UK and particularly the US.16
A common argument is that variations in management practice result from the differences in
product market competition, either because of selection effects and/or because of variations in
the incentives to supply effort. Table 2 attempts to investigate this by examining the relationship
between product market competition and management. We use three broad measures of
competition following Nickell (1996) and Aghion et al. (2005). The first is the country by 3-digit
SIC industry Lerner index of competition, which is (1 – profits/sales), calculated at the average
across the entire firm level database (excluding each firm itself)
21. This is constructed for the
period 1995-1999 to remove any potential contemporaneous feedback. The second measure is the
degree of import penetration in the country by 3-digit SIC industry measured as the share of total
inputs over domestic production. Again, this is constructed for the period 1995-1999 to remove
any potential contemporaneous feedback. The third measure of competition is the survey
question on the number of competitors a firm faces (see Appendix A2), valued 0 for “non
competitors”, 1 for “less than 5 competitors”, and 2 for “5 or more competitors”
22.
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
In column (1) we see the Lerner index of competition measure is positive and strongly significant
after controlling for simple country levels effects, providing evidence for a positive role for
competition in improving management practices. In column (2) we re-estimate the same
specification but now include a full set of industry, firm and noise controls, and again find that
higher competition is significantly correlated with better current management. Thus more
competitive country-industry pairings contain firms which are on-average significantly better
managed. In columns (3) and (4) we run two similar specifications on lagged import penetration
as a trade competition measure and again find a significant and positive effect. Finally, in
columns (5) and (6), we run two further similar specification, but this time using firms own self
reported measure of the number of competitors they face, and again find a positive and
significant effect: the more rivals a firm perceives it faces, the better managed it appears to be.
One issue in interpreting this competition effect as discussed in section III is that it potentially
works through two mechanisms:
1. Greater competition increases the relative exit rate of badly managed firms versus well
managed firms, and so will increase the average managerial practices of the survivors;
2. Increasing management scores through greater managerial effort.
To investigate these different mechanisms we start by running a non-parametric kernel regression
to look for evidence of a selection effect.
In Figure 5 we plot the cross-sectional relationship between management practices and firm age
for two sub-samples: (i) firms in low competition industries (below the 33
rd percentile of the
country-demeaned Lerner index); and (ii) firms in medium/high competition industries (above
the 33
rd percentile of the country-demeaned Lerner index)
23. For the low competition sample
there is clear evidence of younger firms employing better management practices, while for the
higher competition sample there is a humped shape relationship with an initially improving then
21 Note that in constructing this we draw on firms in the population database, not just those who participated in the
survey.
22 This question has been used by inter alia Nickell (1996) and Stewart (1990).
23 The country level means are removed from the Lerner index to control for differences in accounting definitions
across countries. Similar results are obtained by splitting around the 50th percentile of the country-demeaned Lerner.17
subsequently deteriorating average management practices as firms’ age. Figure 6 contains a
similar plot but with the competition split determined instead by import penetration (above/below
the 33
rd percentile of the country-demeaned Import penetration ratio).
These results appear to be consistent with a selection effect of competition and technological
evolution in management best-practices discussed in section IIB. When firms are young in
competitive industries, the selection effect dominates with the worst managed firms rapidly
exiting, so average management practices improve as the cohort ages. But once the worst
managed firms have exited the selection effect begins to slow down and the vintage effect begins
to dominate, with the age-management relationship flattening and then turning negative. In
uncompetitive industries we should expect to see little selection effect and a dominant vintage
effect, exactly as shown in Figures 5 and 6.
[FIGURES 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE]
Table 3 estimates a linear-regression version of these sample splits showing these age-
management relationship differ significantly according to the level of competition. In column (1)
a straight regression of management practices on log firm-age demonstrates a significant
negative coefficient, suggesting older firms use on average use worse management practices
24.
In column (2) we include the competition measure finding as before a positive competition
effect. In column (3) we add an interaction of (country-demeaned) age and competition, finding a
significant positive interaction term, and in column (4) we add in a full set of controls yielding a
similar positive interaction term. The interpretation of these terms is that age is negatively related
to management practices, but this is significantly less negative at high levels of competition since
age provides a stronger signal of survival and hence good management practices. That is, old
firms in highly competitive industries are much more likely to be well managed than in
uncompetitive industries as they have survived a long period of tougher market selection.
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
Table 4 appears to suggest in converse that the effort effect of competition and management
practices may be relatively unimportant. In columns (1) to (2) we regress managerial hours
worked – our preferred measure of managerial effort - on the Lerner index and import
competition measures of competition, finding no significant results. In columns (3) and (4) we
use sick-leave as an alternative proxy for effort, again finding no significant relationship; and in
columns (5) and (6) we use managers self-reported “work-life balance” score as another effort
proxy again finding no relationship. This suggests that competition plays little if any role in
increasingly managerial practices through higher managerial effort, not inconsistent with the
ambiguous theoretical relationship discussed in section IIA.
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
VI.B Management Practices and Job Regulation
24 The fact that older firms are on average more productive (i.e. see Jensen at al. 2001) suggests offsetting
improvement in other un-measured factors.18
In a number of countries the business press has long argued that government regulations impede
the ability of managers to effectively run their firms. One potential impact of regulations, in
particular labour regulation, is that these could impede the adoption of superior management
practices.
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
To look into this Table 5 starts in column (1) by running a very basic estimation of management
practices on the extent of labour regulations regarding dismissals, as reported by Botero et al.
(2004). We find that countries with tougher labour regulation (France and to a lesser extent
Germany) are worse managed on average than countries with weak regulation (the US and to a
lesser extent the UK). Of course a wide range of other factors varies across countries, and so this
is only an indicative result based on raw cross-country figures. To further investigate the impact
of job regulation we interacted country-specific regulation with variations across firms in the
tenure of workers as a proxy for the impact of these regulations, enabling an identification of
within country-industry effects. In column (2) we estimate the interaction effect of job-regulation
and average managerial tenure. Since we have included country and industry dummies the direct
impact of labour-regulation is not identified but we can see the interaction effect with tenure is
negative and significant. In columns (3) we re-run this specification including the full set of
controls and find this interaction remains negative and significant. Thus, we find in firms where
the bite of dismissal costs should be highest – those with long tenured managers – the impact of
these types of dismissal costs is greatest. This suggests that strong labour regulation inhibit the
adoption of superior management practices.
VII CONCLUSIONS
We use an innovative survey tool to collect management practice data from 731 medium sized
manufacturing firms in Europe (UK, France and Germany) and the US. We find these are
strongly associated with better firm performance in terms of productivity, profitability, Tobin’s
Q, and sales growth. We also find a surprisingly large dispersion of management practices across
firms with a long tail of poorly managed firms. This presents a dilemma - why do so many firms
continue to exist with apparently inferior management practices? We find that this is due, in part,
to a combination of: (i) product market competition, with greater competition stimulating the
deployment of improved management practices; (ii) firm age, with younger market entrants
utilising better management techniques; and (iii) labour market regulations.
A range of potential extensions to this work are planned, including running a second survey wave
on around 2,000 firm in 2006 to follow up these 731 firms to examine the time profile of
management practices; extend the survey to other countries; survey multiple plants in a few
hundred firms to examine plant vs. firms effects; and gather more detailed organisational
structure data. In terms of the current sample we hope to follow this over time and examine the
role of managerial practices in market exit (bankruptcy, take-over and going private).19
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Figure 1: Management practices and age, with competition - simulation
Figure 2: Management practices and age, without competition - simulation
Notes: Figure 1 is from a simulation results from modelling a large fixed population of firms with a 2% annual rate of entry and
exit. The exit occurs based on a noisy signal of management ability. The entrants are drawn from a normal distribution with an
upwardly trending mean. Thus, every period worse managed firms are more likely to exit generating a selection effect over time,
while the new entrants are drawn from an upwardly trending distribution generating a cohort effect. In Figure 2 the competitive
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1st interview score
Note: These are the scores from two interviews on the same firm but with different managers and different
interviewers. 
 
Figure 4: Distribution of management scores by country
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Figure 5: Management practices, firm age and competition (Lerner Index)
Figure 6: Management practices, firm age and competition (Import Penetration)
Note: These are results from a non-parametric kernel regression of the mean management score against firm ln(age). This is
performed separately for firms in high competition sectors vs. low competition sectors (bottom third of the Lerner Index
distribution in Figure 5 and bottom third of the import penetration distribution in Figure 6).25
TABLE 1: PRODUCTION FUNCTION ESTIMATIONS

























































Firms 718 718 718 287 718
Observations 3,797 3,703 3,466 1,373 3,797
Dependent variable



















NOTES: In all columns labour, capital and materials are interacted with country dummies and consolidated status to allow
flexible coefficient across countries and type of account. The baseline is UK consolidated in Columns (1), (2), (3) and (5), and
German consolidated in Column (4). Columns (1), (4) and (5) implement an OLS estimator with fixed-effects (stage 1), and then
regresses these in cross-section against the management z-scores (stage 2). Column (2) implements a version of the Olley-Pakes
(1996) technique. We use a fifth order series approximation for ￿(.) in stage 1. Standard errors are bootstrapped with 100
replications. After calculating the parameters of labour and materials (stage 1a) and capital (stage 1b) we calculate the efficiency
term/TFP. This is used as a dependent variable in the lower panel and regressed on management and its noise controls (stage 2).
Column (3) implements the Blundell-Bond (1998) GMM-SYS technique (stage 1). Instruments for the differenced equation are
lagged levels t-2 to t-3 on sales, capital, labour and materials. Instruments for the levels equation are lagged differenced t-1 on
sales, capital, labour and materials. SC(2) is an LM test of second order correlation of the differenced residuals (see Arellano and
Bond, 1991) and SARGAN is the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identification (distributed ￿
2 under the Null). We impose the
COMFAC restrictions by Minimum Distance (see Blundell and Bond, 2000) and test this by a ￿
2 test of the COMFAC
restrictions. We use the estimated coefficients to calculate TFP which is used as the dependent variable in the lower panel and
regressed on management and the noise controls (stage 2).26
TABLE 2: MANAGEMENT AND PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and clustered by country * industry pair); single cross section. “Country controls” includes 4
country controls. “Full controls” includes a full set of 108 SIC 3-digit industry controls, group and firm size, a
dummy for being listed, being consolidated, a separate dummy variable for all the selected controls in column (2)
table A2: each interviewer (17), the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the day of the week the
interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted and an indicator of the reliability of the
information as coded by the interviewer; “Lerner index of competition” constructed, as in Aghion et al. (2005) , as
the mean of (1 - profit/sales) in the entire database (excluding the firm itself) for every country industry pair.
“Import Penetration” = ln(Import/Production) in every country industry pair. Average over 1995-1999 used.
“Number of competitors” constructed from the response to the survey question on number of competitors, and is
coded as 0 for “none” (1% of responses), 1 for “less than 5” (51% of responses), and 2 for “5 or more” (48% of
responses).
(1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS





















Firms 727 727 733 733 733 733
Observations 727 727 733 733 733 733
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full controls No Yes No Yes No Yes27
TABLE 3: MANAGEMENT, PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND FIRM-AGE
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Management Management Management Management
















Firm age (in logs) × Lerner






Joint test of age terms (p-
value)
0.001 0.002
Joint test of competition
terms (p-value)
0.003 0.037
Firms 727 727 727 727
Observations 727 727 727 727
Country controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full controls No No  No Yes
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and clustered by country * industry pair); single cross section. “Country controls” includes 4
country controls. Firm age and Lerner index terms have country averages removed in the levels and interaction
terms. “Full controls” includes a full set of 108 SIC 3-digit industry controls, group and firm size, a dummy for
being listed, being consolidated, a separate dummy variable for all the selected controls in column (2) table A2: each
interviewer (17), the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was
conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted and an indicator of the reliability of the information as
coded by the interviewer; “Firm age” is years since incorporation. “Lerner index of competition” constructed, as
in Aghion et al. (2005) , as the mean of (1 - profit/sales) in the entire database (excluding the firm itself) for every
country industry pair.28
TABLE 4: MANAGEMENT, PRODUCT MARKET COMPETITION AND EFFORT
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and clustered by country * industry pair); single cross section. “Country controls” includes 4
country controls. “Full controls” includes a full set of 108 Sic 3-digit industry controls, group and firm size, a
dummy for being listed, being consolidated, a separate dummy variable for all the selected controls in column (2)
table A2: each interviewer (17), the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the day of the week the
interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted and an indicator of the reliability of the
information as coded by the interviewer. “Lerner index of competition” constructed, as in Aghion et al. (2005) , as
the mean of (1 - profit/sales) in the entire database (excluding the firm itself) for every country industry pair.
“Import Penetration” = ln(Import/Outputs) in every country industry pair. Average over 1995-1999 used.
(1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6)
Estimation

































Firms 548 551 520 520 525 525
Observations 548 551 520 520 525 525
Country
controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Full controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes29
TABLE 5: MANAGEMENT AND EMPLOYMENT REGULATION
(1) (2) (3)
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS















Firms 656 656 656




Full Controls No No Yes
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity); single cross section. “Job Regulation” is the average legal index of “cost of firing workers” and
“dismissal procedures” from Botero et al. (2004). “Tenure of manager” is the tenure of the interviewed manager
(usually the plant manager). “Country and industry controls” includes 4 country and 108 SIC 3-digit industries
controls. “Full controls” includes a full set of 108 Sic 3-digit industry controls, group and firm size, a dummy for
being listed, being consolidated, a separate dummy variable for all the selected controls in column (2) table A2: each
interviewer (17), the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded, the day of the week the interview was
conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted and an indicator of the reliability of the information as
coded by the interviewer.30
APPENDIX A: MANAGEMENT PRACTICE INTERVIEW GUIDE AND ANONYMIZED
EXAMPLE RESPONSES
Note: Any score from 1 to 5 can be given, but the scoring guide and examples are only provided for scores of 1, 3 and 5.




Other than JIT delivery from suppliers
few modern manufacturing techniques
have been introduced, (or have been
introduced in an ad-hoc manner)
Some aspects of modern (lean)
manufacturing techniques have been
introduced, through informal/isolated
change programmes
All major aspects of modern/lean manufacturing have
been introduced (Just-in-time, autonomation, flexible
manpower, support systems, attitudes and behaviour) in
a formal way
Example: A UK firm orders in bulk and stores the
material on average 6 months before use.
The business focuses on quality and not
reduction of lead time or costs.
Absolutely no lean manufacturing
techniques had been introduced.
A supplier to the army is undergoing a full
lean transformation. For 20 years the
company was a specialty supplier to the
army, but now they have had to identify
other competencies forcing them to
compete with lean manufacturers. They
have begun adopting specific lean
techniques and plan to use full lean by the
end of next year.
A US firm has formally introduced all major elements
of lean production. It reconfigured the factory floor
based on value stream mapping and 5-S principles,
broke production into cells, eliminated stockrooms,
implemented Kanban, and adopted Takt time analyses




Modern (lean) manufacturing techniques
were introduced because others were
using them.
Modern (lean) manufacturing techniques
were introduced to reduce costs
Modern (lean) manufacturing techniques were
introduced to enable us to meet our business objectives
(including costs)
Example: A German firm introduced lean because
all its competitors were using these
techniques. The business decision had
been taken to imitate the competition.
A French firm introduced modern
manufacturing methods primarily to
reduce costs.
A US firm implemented lean techniques because the
COO had worked with them before and knew that they
would enable the business to reduce costs, while
competing with cheaper imports through improved




No, process improvements are made
when problems occur.
Improvements are made in 1 week
workshops involving all staff, to improve
performance in their area of the plant
Exposing problems in a structured way is integral to
individuals’ responsibilities and resolution occurs as a
part of normal business processes rather than by
extraordinary effort/teams
Example:
A US firm has no formal or informal
mechanism in place for either process
documentation or improvement. The
manager admitted that production takes
place in an environment where nothing
has been done to encourage or support
process innovation.
A US firm takes suggestions via an
anonymous box, they then review these
each week in their section meeting and
decide any that they would like to proceed
with.
The employees of a German firm constantly analyse the
production process as part of their normal duty. They
film critical production steps to analyse areas more
thoroughly. Every problem is registered in a special
database that monitors critical processes and each issue
must be reviewed and signed off by a manager.
4 Performance
tracking
Measures tracked do not indicate directly
if overall business objectives are being
met. Tracking is an ad-hoc process
(certain processes aren’t tracked at all)
Most key performance indicators are
tracked formally. Tracking is overseen by
senior management.
Performance is continuously tracked and
communicated, both formally and informally, to all
staff using a range of visual management tools.
Example: A manager of a US firm tracks a range of
measures when he does not think that
output is sufficient. He last requested
these reports about 8 months ago and had
them printed for a week until output
increased again.
At a US firm every product is bar-coded
and performance indicators are tracked
throughout the production process;
however, this information is not
communicated to workers
A US firm has screens in view of every line. These
screens are used to display progress to daily target and
other performance indicators. The manager meets with
the shop floor every morning to discuss the day past
and the one ahead and uses monthly company meetings
to present a larger view of the goals to date and
strategic direction of the business to employees. He
even stamps napkins with key performance
achievements to ensure everyone is aware of a target
that has been hit.
5 Performance
review
Performance is reviewed infrequently or
in an un-meaningful way e.g. only
success or failure is noted.
Performance is reviewed periodically with
both successes and failures identified.
Results are communicated to senior
management. No clear follow-up plan is
adopted.
Performance is continually reviewed, based on
indicators tracked. All aspects are followed up ensure
continuous improvement. Results are communicated to
all staff32
Example: A manager of a US firm relies heavily on
his gut feel of the business. He will
review costs when he thinks they have too
much or too little in the stores shed. He
admits that as he is very busy so such a
review can be quite infrequent. He also
mentioned that staffs feel like he is going
on a hunt to find a problem, so he has
now made a point of highlighting
anything good that he finds too.
A UK firm uses daily production meetings
to compare performance to plan.
However, clear action plans are
infrequently developed based on these
production results.
A French firm tracks all performance numbers real time
(amount, quality etc). These numbers are continuously
matched to the plan on a shift-by-shift basis. Every
employee can access these figures on workstations on
the shop floor. If scheduled numbers are not met, action
for improvement is taken immediately.
6 Performance
dialogue
The right data or information for a
constructive discussion is often not
present or conversations overly focus on
data that is not meaningful. Clear agenda
is not known and purpose is not stated
explicitly
Review conversations are held with the
appropriate data and information present.
Objectives of meetings are clear to all
participating and a clear agenda is present.
Conversations do not, as a matter of
course, drive to the root causes of the
problems.
Regular review/performance conversations focus on
problem solving and addressing root causes. Purpose,
agenda and follow-up steps are clear to all. Meetings
are an opportunity for constructive feedback and
coaching.
Example: A US firm doesn’t conduct staff reviews.
It was just “not the philosophy of the
company” to do that. The company was
very successful during the last decade and
therefore didn’t feel the need to review
their performance.
A UK firm focuses on key areas to discuss
each week. This ensures that key areas of
the business receive consistent
management attention and everyone
comes prepared. Once the discussion takes
place of what is happening they move to
the next topic. However, meetings are
more of an opportunity for everyone to
stay abreast of current issues rather than
problem solve.
A German firm meets weekly to discuss performance
with workers and management (plus daily team
meetings run by the supervisors). Participants come
from different departments (shop floor, sales, R&D,
procurement) to discuss the previous week performance
and to identify areas to improve. They focus on the root
cause of problems and agree topics to be followed up




Failure to achieve agreed objectives does
not carry any consequences
Failure to achieve agreed results is
tolerated for a period before action is
taken.
A failure to achieve agreed targets drives retraining in
identified areas of weakness or moving individuals to
where their skills are appropriate33
Example: At a French firm no action is taken when
objectives aren’t achieved. The President
personally intervenes to warn employees
but no stricter action is taken. Cutting
payroll or making people redundant
because of a lack of performance is very
rarely done.
Management of a US firm reviews
performance quarterly. That is the earliest
they can react to any underperformance.
They increase pressure on the employees
if targets are not met.
A German firm takes action as soon as a weakness is
identified. They have even employed a psychologist to
improve behaviour within a difficult group. People
receive ongoing training to improve performance. If
this doesn’t help they move them in other departments
or even fire individuals if they repeatedly fail to meet
agreed targets
8 Target balance Goals are exclusively financial or
operational
Goals include non-financial targets, which
form part of the performance appraisal of
top management only (they are not
reinforced throughout the rest of
organisation)
Goals are a balance of financial and non-financial
targets. Senior managers believe the non-financial
targets are often more inspiring and challenging than
financials alone.
Example: At a UK firm performance targets are
exclusively operational. Specifically
volume is the only meaningful objective
for managers, with no targeting of quality,
flexibility or waste.
For a French firm strategic goals are very
important. They focus on market share and
try to hold their position in technology
leadership. However, workers on the shop
floor are not aware of those targets.
A US firm gives everyone a mix of operational and
financial targets. They communicate financial targets to
the shop floor in a way they found effective – for
example telling workers they pack boxes to pay the
overheads until lunch time and after lunch it is all profit
for the business. If they are having a good day the
boards immediately adjust and play the profit jingle to
let the shop floor know that they are now working for
profit. Everyone cheers when the jingle is played.
9 Targets
interconnection
Goals are based purely on accounting
figures (with no clear connection to
shareholder value)
Corporate goals are based on shareholder
value but are not clearly cascaded down to
individuals
Corporate goals focus on shareholder value. They
increase in specificity as they cascade through business
units ultimately defining individual performance
expectations.
Example: A family owned firm in France is only
concerned about the net income for the
year. They try to maximise income every
year without focusing on any long term
consequences.
A US firm bases its strategic corporate
goals on enhancing shareholder value, but
does not clearly communicate this to
workers. Departments and individuals
have little understanding of their
connection to profitability or value with
For a US firm strategic planning begins with a bottom
up approach which is then compared with the top down
aims. Multifunctional teams meet every 6 months to
track and plan deliverables for each area. This is then
presented to the area head that then agrees or refines it
and then communicates it down to his lowest level.34
many areas labeled as “cost-centers” with
an objective to cost-cut despite potentially
disproportionately large negative impact
on the other departments they serve.
Everyone has to know exactly how they contribute to
the overall goals or else they won’t understand how




Top management's main focus is on short
term targets
There are short and long term goals for all
levels of the organisation. As they are set
independently, they are not necessarily
linked to each other
Long term goals are translated into specific short term
targets so that short term targets become a "staircase" to
reach long term goals
Example: A UK firm has had several years of
ongoing senior management changes –
therefore senior managers are only
focussing on how the company is doing
this month versus the next, believing that
long-term targets will take care of
themselves.
A US firm has both long and short term
goals. The long term goals are known by
the senior managers and the short term
goals are the remit of the operational
managers. Operations managers only
occasionally see the longer term goals so
are often unsure how they link with the
short term goals.
A UK firm translates all their goals – even their 5 year
strategic goals - into short term goals so that they can
track their performance to them. They believe that it is
only when you make someone accountable for delivery
within a sensible timeframe that a long term objective
will be met. They think it is more interesting for




Goals are either too easy or impossible to
achieve; managers low-ball estimates to
ensure easy goals
In most areas, top management pushes for
aggressive goals based on solid economic
rationale. There are a few "sacred cows"
that are not held to the same rigorous
standard
Goals are genuinely demanding for all divisions. They
are grounded in solid, solid economic rationale
Example: A French firm uses easy targets to
improve staff morale and encourage
people. They find it difficult to set harder
goals because people just give up and
managers refuse to work people harder.
A chemicals firm has 2 divisions,
producing special chemicals for very
different markets (military, civil).
Different levels of difficulty are applied
for each division based on the current
developments in each market.
A manager of a UK firm insisted that he has to set
aggressive and demanding goals for everyone – even
security. If they hit all their targets he worries he hasn’t
stretched them enough. Each KPI is linked to the
overall business plan and for the business to stay in the




clarity and Performance measures are complex and
not clearly understood. Individual
Performance measures are well defined
and communicated; performance is public
Performance measures are well defined, strongly
communicated and reinforced at all reviews;35
comparability performance is not made public in all levels but comparisons are
discouraged
performance and rankings are made public to induce
competition
Example: A German firm measures performance per
employee based on differential weighting
across 12 factors, each with its own
measurement formulas (e.g. individual
versus average of the team, increase on
prior performance, thresholds etc.).
Employees complain the formula is too
complex to understand, and even the plant
manager couldn’t remember all the
details.
A French firm doesn’t encourage simple
individual performance measures as
unions pressure them to avoid this.
However, charts display the actual overall
production process against the plan for
teams on regular basis.
At a US firm self-directed teams set and monitor their
own goals. These goals and their subsequent outcomes
are posted throughout the company, encouraging
competition in both target-setting and achievement.
Individual members know where they are ranked which
is communicated personally to them bi-annually.
Quarterly company meetings seek to review
performance and align targets.
13 Managing
human capital
Senior management do not communicate
that attracting, retaining and developing
talent throughout the organisation is a top
priority
Senior management believe and
communicate that having top talent
throughout the organisation is a key way
to win
Senior managers are evaluated and held accountable on
the strength of the talent pool they actively build
Example: A US firm does not actively train or
develop its employees, and does not
conduct performance appraisals or
employee reviews. People are seen as a
secondary input to the production.
A US firm strives to attract and retain
talent throughout the organization, but
does not hold managers individually
accountable for the talent pool they build.
The company actively cross-trains
employees for development and
challenges them through exposure to a
variety of technologies.
A UK firm benchmarks human resources practices at
leading firms. A cross-functional HR excellence
committee develops policies and strategies to achieve
company goals. Bi-monthly directors’ meetings seek to




People within our firm are rewarded
equally irrespective of performance level
Our company has an evaluation system for
the awarding of performance related
rewards
We strive to outperform the competitors by providing
ambitious stretch targets with clear performance related
accountability and rewards
Example: An East Germany firm pays its people
equally and regardless of performance.
The management said to us that “there are
A German firm has an awards system
based on three components: the
individual’s performance, shift
A US firms stretches employees by setting ambitious
targets. They reward performance through a
combination of bonuses linked to performance, team36
no incentives to perform well in our
company”. Even the management are paid
an hourly wage, with no bonus pay.
performance, and overall company
performance.
lunches cooked by management, family picnics, movie
passes and dinner vouchers at nice local restaurants.
They also motivate staff to try by giving awards for
perfect attendance, best suggestion etc.
15 Removing poor
performers
Poor performers are rarely removed from
their positions
Suspected poor performers stay in a
position for a few years before action is
taken
We move poor performers out of the company or to
less critical roles as soon as a weakness is identified
Example: A French firm had a supervisor who was
regularly drinking alcohol at work but no
action was taken –to help him, move him
to a less critical role or even give him a
warning. His performance was poor and
his team did not respect him. In fact no
employee had ever been laid off in the
factory despite incidences like this.
According to the plant manager HR
kicked up a real fuss whenever
management wanted to get rid of
employees, and told managers their job
was production not personnel.
For a German firm it is very hard to
remove poor performers. The management
has to prove at least 3 times that an
individual underperformed before they can
take serious action.
At a US firm the manager fired 4 people during last
couple of months due to underperformance. They
continually investigate why and who are
underperforming. At another US firm the manager said
“sure we fire poor performers – I’m the third plant
manager in the last 2 years, the last two got sacked for
not fixing this place”
16 Promoting high
performers
People are promoted primarily upon the
basis of tenure
People are promoted upon the basis of
performance
We actively identify, develop and promote our top
performers
Example: A UK firm promotes based on an
individual’s commitment to the company
measured by experience. Hence almost all
employees move up the firm in lock-step.
Management was afraid to change this
process because it would create bad-
feeling among the older employees who
were resistant to change.
A US firm has no formal training program.
People learn on the job and are promoted
based on their performance on the job.
At a UK firm each employee is given a red light (not
performing), amber light (doing well and meeting
targets) a green light (consistently meeting targets very
high performer) and a blue light (high performer
capable of promotion of up to two levels). Each
manager is assessed every quarter on the basis of his





Our competitors offer stronger reasons for
talented people to join their companies
Our value proposition to those joining our
company is comparable to those offered
by others in the sector
We provide a unique value proposition to encourage
talented people join our company above our
competitors
Example: A manager of a firm in Germany could
not give an example of a distinctive
employee proposition and (when pushed)
thinks the offer is probably worse than
most of its competitors. He thought that
people working at the firm “have drawn
the short straw”.
A US firm seeks to create a value
proposition comparable to its competitors
and other local companies by offering
competitive pay, a family atmosphere, and
a positive presence in the community.
A German firm offers a unique value proposition
through development and training programs, family
culture in the company and very flexible working
hours. It also strives to reduce bureaucracy and seeks to
push decision making down to the lowest levels




We do little to try and keep our top talent. We usually work hard to keep our top
talent.
We do whatever it takes to retain our top talent.
Example: A German firm lets people leave the
company if they want. They do nothing to
keep those people since they think that it
would make no sense to try to keep them.
Management doesn’t think they can keep
people if they want to work somewhere
else. The company also won’t start salary
negotiations to retain top talent.
If management of a French firm feels that
people want to leave the company, they
talk to them about the reasons and what
the company could change to keep them.
This could be more responsibilities or a
better outlook for the future. Managers are
supposed to “take-the-pulse” of employees
to check satisfaction levels.
A US firm knows who its top performers are and if any
of them signal an interest to leave it pulls in senior
managers and even corporate HQ to talk to them and
try and persuade them to stay. Occasionally they will
increase salary rates if necessary and if they feel the
individual is being underpaid relative to the market.
Managers have a responsibility to try to keep all
desirable staff.38
TABLE A1: QUESTION LEVEL AVERAGES BY COUNTRY
UK Germany France
US=100 US=100 US=100












































































































NOTES: Standard errors of each question’s average response are reported below in brackets. Calculated from full sample of
731 firms for which management information is available. Management z-scores used in the calculations.39
APPENDIX A: HUMAN RESOURCES INTERVIEW GUIDE
Run in parallel as the management survey but targeted at the HR department
Workforce Characteristics
Data Field Breakdown
Total number of employees (all employees)
% with university degree (all employees)
% with MBA (all employees)
Average age of employees (all employees)
% of employees (managerial/non-managerial)
Average training days per year (managerial/non-managerial)
Average hours worked per week (inc overtime, exc. breaks) (managerial/non-managerial)
Average holidays per year (all employees)
Weeks maternity leave (all employees)
Weeks paternity leave (all employees)
Average days sick-leave (all employees)
% part-time (managerial/non-managerial)
% female (managerial/non-managerial)
% employees abroad (all employees)
% union membership (all employees)
Are unions recognized for wages bargaining [yes / no] (all employees)
Organisational Characteristics
Question Response choice (all employees)
Who decides the pace of work? [exclusively workers / mostly workers / equally /
mostly managers / exclusively managers]
Who decides how tasks should be allocated? [exclusively workers / mostly workers/ equally /
mostly managers / exclusively managers]
Do you use self-managing teams? [v. heavily / heavily / moderately / slightly / none]
Work-life Balance: Perceptions
Question Response choice (all employees)
Relative to other companies in your industry [much less / slightly less / the same / slightly
how much does your company emphasize more / much more]
work-life balance?
Is it up to an individual employee (rather than [yes/no]
the company) to balance their work/life balance?
Work-Life Balance: Policies
Question Response choice (managerial/non-managerial)
If an employee needed to take a day off at short [Not allowed / Never Been Asked / Take as leave
due child-care problems or their child was sick how without pay / Take time off but make it up later
do they generally do this? / Take as annual leave / Take as sick leave]
What entitlements are there to the following Breakdown
Working at home in normal working hours? (managerial/non-managerial)
Switching from full-time to part-time work? (managerial/non-managerial)
Job sharing schemes? (managerial/non-managerial)
Workplace nursery or nursery linked to workplace? (managerial/non-managerial)
Financial subsidy to help pay for childcare? (managerial/non-managerial)
School time contracts only? (managerial/non-managerial)
Market & firm questions: Response choice
# of competitors [none / less than 5 / 5 or more]
# hostile take-over bids in last three years [none / one / more than one ]
Average IT spend over the last 3 years
Interviewer’s assessment of the scoring reliability
1 to 5 scoring system calibrated according to:
1 = Interviewee did not have enough expertise for interview to be valuable; I have significant doubts about
most of the management dimensions probed]
3 = Interviewee had reasonable expertise; on some dimensions I am unsure of scoring
5 = Interviewee had good expertise, I am confident that the score reflects management practices in this firm40
APPENDIX B: DATA
Sampling Frame Construction
Our sampling frame was based on the Fame dataset for the UK, Amadeus dataset for Europe
and the Compustat dataset for the USA. We chose firms whose principle industry was in
manufacturing and who employed (on average between 2000 and 2003) no less than 50
employees and no more than 10,000 employees. We also removed any clients of McKinsey
and Company from the sampling frame (33 out of 1353 firms).
We believe that our sampling frame is reasonably representative of medium sized
manufacturing firms. The European firms in Amadeus include both private and public firms
whereas Compustat only includes publicly listed firms. There is no US database with
privately listed firms with information on sales, labour and capital. Fortunately, there are a
much larger number of US firms listed on the stock exchange than in Europe so we are able to
go substantially down the size distribution with Compustat. Nevertheless, the US firms are
slightly larger than those of the other countries, so we are always careful to control for size in
our analyses. Furthermore our preferred specifications allow all coefficients to be different on
labour, capital, materials and consolidation status by country.
Another concern is that we condition on firms where we have information on sales,
employment and capital. These items are not compulsory for firms below certain size
thresholds so disclosure is voluntary to some extent for the smaller firms. Luckily the firms in
our sampling frame (over 50 workers) are past the threshold for voluntary disclosure (the only
exception is for capital in Germany).
We achieved a response rate of 54% from the firms that we contacted: a very high success
rate given the voluntary nature of participation. Respondents were not significantly more
productive than non-respondents. French firms were slightly less likely to respond than firms
in the other three countries and all respondents were significantly larger than non-
respondents. Apart from these two factors, respondents seemed randomly spread around our
sampling frame
Firm level data
Our firm accounting data on sales, employment, capital, profits, shareholder equity, long-term
debt, market values (for quoted firms) and wages (where available) came from Fame (UK),
Amadeus (France and Germany) and Compustat (US). For other data fields we did the
following:
Materials: In France and Germany these are line items in the accounts. In the UK these were
constructed by deducting the total wage bill from the cost of goods sold. In the US these were
constructed following the method in Bresnahan et al. (2002). We start with costs of good sold
(COGS) less depreciation (DP) less labor costs (XLR). For firms who do not report labor
expenses expenditures we use average wages and benefits at the four-digit industry level
(Bartelsman, Becker and Gray, 2000, until 1996 and then Census Average Production Worker
Annual Payroll by 4-digit NAICS code) and multiply this by the firm's reported employment
level. This constructed measure is highly correlated at the industry level with materials.
Obviously there may be problems with this measure of materials (and therefore value added)
which is why we check robustness to measures without materials.41
CEO Pay and Age: In the US the S&P 1500 largest firms (which cover all sectors) are
contained in Execucomp, which provided data for 106 largest of our US firms. For the
remaining firms we manually downloaded the Def14a proxy statements from the SEC to
extract the details of the CEO and CFO compensation package and age over the last three
accounting years
25. In the UK the highest paid director is a mandatory line item in the
accounts and we took this as the CEO’s salary. In France and Germany we have no data on
executive pay.
Company Shareholdings: This was manually extracted from the Bloomberg online data
service for the 10 largest shareholders and the 10 largest insider shareholders.
Dates of Incorporation: For UK, French and German companies this is provided by the Fame
and Amadeus datasets. For the US this was obtained from Dunn and Bradstreet.
R&D: For the US firms this is provided in Compustat. For quoted European firms we
obtained this from Datastream UK and Datastream Europe. For unquoted European firms we
have no R&D data.
Industry level data
This comes from the OECD STAN database of industrial production. This is provided at the
country ISIC Rev. 3 level and is mapped into US SIC (1997) 3 (which is our common
industry definition in all four countries).
25 Many thanks to Guy Clark, Jatin Gulati, Sejal Mehta and Rahul Rathi for the construction of this and the
Bloomberg share-ownership data.42
TABLE B1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
All UK US Germany France
Number of firms, # 731 152 289 154 136
Management (mean z score) 0.009 -0.144 0.108 0.075 -0.077
Employment (mean) 1,964 1,750 2,476 1,880 1,215
Employment(median) 690 418 1,251 974 311
Material share of output, % 49.2  46.5  53.9  54.7 42.8 
Labour share of output,% 26.5  27.9  29.5  28.0 22.9 
Return of Capital Employed (ROCE), % 9.94 10.89 5.84 12.9 15.38
Tobin’s Q 2.51 2.01 2.87 1.77 1.37
Nominal sales growth rate, % 11.1 5.1 7.9 4.9 8.1
Unconsolidated, % .257 .094 0 .341 .804
Age of firm (years) 44.3 42.9 42.6 54.9 39.6
Listed firm,% 55.7  28.3 100 40.0  15.4 
Multinational subsidiary, % 8.8 9.2  0 22.3  11.0 
Share workforce with degrees, % 21.0 13.5 30.6 14.2 15.4
Share workforce with an MBA, % 1.00 0.97 1.89 0.07 0.20
Sickness, days/year 6.850 6.06 5.07 8.48 8.29
Hours, hours per week 40.5 40.2 44.0 38.6 35.6
Holidays, days per year 22.8 25.8 12.2 29.7 32.3
Union density, % 19.0 8.7 22.6 40.8 10.2
Number of competitors index, 1=”none”, 2=”a
few”, 3=”many” 2.28 2.37 2.26 2.25 2.16
Shareholder concentration, % held by top 10
shareholders 53.3 51.5 59.1 41.3 63.6
Insider shareholder concentration, % held by
top 10 insider shareholders 10.6 10.8 8.8 27.9 n/a
Lerner index of competition, 2000-2003,
excluding the firm itself 0.054 0.077 0.030 0.048 0.038
Openness (export + imports) / output 0.616 0.809 0.424 0.737 0.667
Notes: Data descriptives calculated on the full sample of 731 firms for which management information is available.43
APPENDIX C: MEASUREMENT ERROR AND NOISE
CONTROLS
Decomposing Variation and Measurement Error
We decompose the variation in the question level z-scores ij q into four components
ij i ij i ij e u p m q + + + = (where subscript i denotes firm and j denotes practice): the average
firm management practice i m ; the practice specific deviations from the average firm
management practice ij p where ￿ = 0 ij p ; the average firm-level measure error i u ; and the
practice specific deviation in measurement error from the firm average measurement error ij e
where ￿ = 0 ij e .
Assuming that the practice deviations and measurement error deviations are i.i.d. within firms
(although not across firms) we can decompose the variance in ij q as
2 2 2 2 1 e u p m ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ + + + =
using the fact that z-scores have a variance of 1. To determine these values of these
components we exploit the information in the first and second interviews and the variance of
question scores within and between firms.
At the question level the regression coefficient from the first on the second interview
responses will take the value
2 2 2 2
2 2
e u p m
p m





= , from applying the standard result on
the attenuation bias due to measurement error. The average coefficient
26 from the first on
second interviews and the second on first interviews is 0.578. At the firm level the regression
coefficient of the first interview average scores on the second interview average scores will








= . The average coefficient from the first on second and second on
first interviews is 0.752. Finally, decomposing the variance in question scores within and
between firms provides values on
2 2
u m ￿ ￿ + and
2 2
e p ￿ ￿ + of 0.466 and 0.534.
Combining these three results together with the definition of the variances allows us to
calculate
2
m ￿ = 0.350,
2
p ￿ = 0.228,
2
u ￿ = 0.116, and
2
e ￿ = 0.306. Thus, we estimate the ratio of
variation from management practices to measurement error to be 58:42 at the question level.
This ratio rises to 75:25 at the firm level due to the higher correlation of management
practices than measurement error across questions within the firm. Interestingly the variation
in these management practices is driven both by changes in firm average management
practices (61%) and in firm specific practice capabilities (39%).
26 The regression of the first interview questions on the second interview questions provides an estimate of the
measurement error in the second interviews, while the regression of the second on first interview questions
provides an estimate of the measurement error in the first interview. Taking the average coefficient from these
two regressions provides a sample average of the measurement error.44
TABLE C1: NOISE CONTROLS FOR MEASUREMENT ERROR IN THE
MANAGEMENT INTERVIEW45







All Controls Selected Controls
Male Respondent is male 0.978 0.023
(0.200)
Seniority The position of manager in the









Years with the company 11.887 0.002
(0.004)
Countries Total number of countries worked in





Organisations Total number of organisations
worked in over last ten years










The manager was born in the USA 0.317 0.231
(0131)
Location of manager Manager based on site or in
corporate HQ


































The time of the day GMT (24 hour
clock) interview conducted
14.28
Days from start of
project
















Reliability score Interviewer’s subjective ranking of











NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary heteroskedasticity);
single cross section; 3 country dummies and 108 sic 3-digit dummies included in the regression; 731 observations47
APPENDIX D: ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE ESTIMATES
TABLE D1 ALTERNATIVE PERFORMANCE SPECIFICATIONS
NOTES: Coefficients from OLS regressions with standard errors in parentheses (robust to arbitrary
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation through clustering by firm); sample period 1998-2004. “Factor
coefficients interacted with industry dummies” allows labour, capital, materials (and a dummy for
subsidiary status) to be interacted with country dummies. UK is the baseline; “Industry dummies
interacted with country dummies” interactions allows all 2 digit SIC dummies to vary with country;
“Extended controls” include the average hours worked in the firm, the average days lost to sickness
and holidays over the year, the proportion of the workforce with a college degree or equivalent, firm
age, a dummy for consolidation status and a dummy for whether or not the firm has a stock market
listing; “Interviewer controls” includes a separate dummy variable for all the selected controls in
column (2) table A2: each interviewer (17), the seniority and tenure of the manager who responded,
the day of the week the interview was conducted, the time of the day the interview was conducted and
an indicator of the reliability of the information as coded by the interviewer. Growth rates of sales
calculated using the formula growth rate Xit=(Xit-Xit-1) / Xit-1 
(1) (2) (3) (4)  (5) 
Estimation Method OLS OLS OLS OLS OLS
Dependent variable Ln (Sales) Ln (Sales) ROCE Ln (Tobin’s Q) Sales
growth rate















































Firms 717 717 717 374 717









No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Extended controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Interviewer controls No Yes Yes Yes Yes